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TAX PROBLEMS PRESENTED BY THE TENNESSEE

CONSTITUTION
EUGENE L. PARKER, JR.*
INTRODUCTION

Although the North Carolina Constitution of 1776 had no specific tax
provision, the draftsmen of Tennessee's Constitution of 17961 initiated a
standard which reflected the creed of the frontier. These pioneers thought
that every free man should contribute something to the support of the
government and those with more ability should contribute more. The ability
of the citizen was measured by the quantity of land and the number of
slaves, which provided roughly a fair differentiation. Everyone had a similar
log cabin; one lot in a settlement was worth about the same as another;
one cleared acre was the equal of another where land was plentiful and only
the best taken. The equality of the frontier made the standard workable
and fair.
The frontier receded westward so that by 1834 marginal lands were
occupied. Towns and villages had sprung up with their residential and
business districts. No longer was one lot or one acre roughly the equivalent
of another. Nor were similar log cabins universal; there were plantation
houses and store buildings. Slaves had become an important investment
and a measure of a man's wealth. New types of property such as bank
shares and railroad investments appeared. In short, the equality of the
frontier disappeared with the maturity of the agricultural community. The
valuation standard necessarily replaced the quantity standard. 2
With the introduction of the valuation standard came the concept that
all property which was taxed should be treated in an equal and uniform
*A.B., 1947, LL.B., 1950, Harvard; presently connected with Chase National Bank,
New York, N. Y.

1. Art. I, § 26: "All lands liable to taxation, in this state, held by deed, grant or

entry, shall be taxed equal and uniform, in such manner, that no one hundred acres shall
be taxed higher than another, except town lots, which shall not be taxed higher than
two hundred acres of land each; no free man shall be taxed higher than one hundred
acres, and no slave higher than two hundred acres, on each poll." Art. I, § 27: "No
article manufactured of the produce of this state, shall be taxed otherwise than to pay
inspection fees." This section was carried verbatim into the Constitutions of 1834 and 1870.
2. TENN. CoxsT., Art. II, § 28 (1934): "All lands liable to taxation, held by deed,
grant, or entry, town lots, bank stock, slaves between the ages of twelve and fifty years,
and such other property as the Legislature may from time to time deem expedient, shall
be taxable. All property shall be taxed according to its value; that value to be ascertained
in such manner as the Legislature shall direct, so that the same shall be equal and uniform
throughout the State. No one species of property from which a tax may be collected,
shall be taxed higher than any other species of property of equal value. But the Legislature
shall have power to tax merchants, pedlars, and privileges, in such manner as they may,
from time to time, direct. A tax on white polls shall be laid in such manner and of such
amount as may be prescribed by law." Art. II, § 29 permitted the legislature to authorize
counties and towns to tax upon the same principles. Art. II, § 30 is identical to Art. 1,

§ 27 (1796), supra note 1.
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manner. The poll tax alone was mandatory. Exemptions were not prohibited,
and by implication, the legislature's discretion controlled. Classification, in
effect, consisted of all or nothing at all. The alternatives were exemption or
taxation, and, if taxed ad valorem, all propery must receive similar treatment.
Classification of realty was considered by the Convention, but specifically rejected. 3 No doubt the emotional appeal of the concept of equal treatment founded upon valuation subdued any arguments advanced for classification and special .treatment. This is understandable in the light of legislative
discretion to exempt personalty entirely and the relative insignificance of
that personality, especially intangibles. Of course, realty is the easiest to
administer as a single class.
Merchants and peddlers were recognized as a profitable source of
revenue. "Privileges" seemed to have been tossed in for good measure, but
the word has become the cornerstone for a multitude of modern taxes. As
we shall see, 1834 became the back-drop for the 1950 melodrama.
The present Constitution, adopted in 1870, has not been altered by
amendment or otherwise. Section 28 of Article II, segmented for convenience,
reads as follows:
"All property, real, personal or mixed, shall be taxed, but the Legislature may
except such as may be held by the State, by counties, cities or towns, and used exclusively
for public or corporation purposes, and such as may be held and used for purposes purely
religious, charitable, scentific, literary or educational, and shall except one thousand
dollars' worth of personal property in the hands of each tax-payer, and the direct product
of the soil in the hands of the producer and his immediate vendee.
"All property shall be taxed according to its value, that value to be ascertained in
such manner as the Legislature shall direct, so that taxes shall be equal and uniform
throughout the State. No one species of property from which a tax may be collected
shall be taxed higher than any other species of property of the same value.
"But the Legislature shall have power to tax Merchants, Peddlers, and privileges,
in such manner as they may from time to time direct. The portion of a Merchant's
Capital used in the purchase of Merchandise sold by him to non-residents and sent
beyond the State, shall not be taxed at a rate higher than the ad valorem tax on property.
"The Legislature shall have the power to levy a tax upon incomes derived from
stocks and bonds that are not taxed ad valorem.
"All male citizens of this State over the age of twenty-one years, except such persons
as may be exempted by law on account of age or other infirmity, shall be liable to a
poll tax of not less than fifty cents nor more than one dollar per annum. Nor shall any
county or corporation levy a poll tax exceeding the amount levied by the State."'
3. TENN. CoNsT. Coxv. Joun. 267 (1834). Classification was voted down 41 to 12.
This was the amendment offered by one White: "All lands liable to taxation in this
state, held by deed, grant or entry, whenever the same shall be taxed, shall be taxed in
proportion to their value; this value to be ascertained by classification, assessment or
any other mode that the Legislature may from time to time think proper to adopt." The
convention was so concerned about the abolition of slavery, the selection of a permanent
capitol, and the creation of new counties that taxation received little attention.
4. See also TEN. CoNsT. Art. II, § 29: "The General Assembly shall have power
to authorize the several counties and incorporated towns of this State, to impose taxes
for county and corporation purposes respectively, in such manner as shall be prescribed
by law; and all property shall be taxed according to its value; upon the principleg
established in regard to state taxation. . . ." Art. 11, § 30: "No article manufactured
of the produce of this State, shall be taxed otherwise then to pay inspection fees."
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The Constitution of 1834 remained the core of the new provisions,
apparently without much discussion.5 Yet the additional trimmings are
significant. The discretionary exemption theory was reversed because of
abusive use by the General Assembly in granting favorable treatment in
charter provisions of banks and railroads.0 Taxation of "all property"
became mandatory with exemptions specifically limited to permissive ones
for governmental and eleemosynary activities and mandatory ones covering
$1,000 of personalty and "product(s) of the soil" in stated circumstances.
"Stocks and bonds" were segregated for possible different treatment, and the
poll tax, with modifications, remained mandatory.
In the 1870 Tennessean economy the exemption of $1,000 plus agricultural inventories covered the personal property of most taxpayers. Livestock and merchant inventories seem to be the main items outside the exemption. Money was scarce even among the wealthy; bank deposits and credits
were of minor importance. Provision was made for stocks and bonds. Thus
the ad valorem tax was designed to reach only land, improvements upon the
land, and the personalty (most tangible) of the few.
Administration would not be difficult, for most wealth was tangible and
could not easily be moved or hidden. In the rural community which existed
at that time a man's wealth was common knowledge. Classification was not
discussed at the Convention because the need was not apparent, and experience
under the preceding constitution was likely satisfactory in this respect. The
result was not unreasonable; the drafters could hardly have dreamed of the
7
changes which were to come in the 20th Century.
Section 28 analytically divides into four types of taxes: ad valorem,
privilege, income and poll. The constitutional interpretation given to each
tax division by the courts -will be considered separately.
THE POLL TAX

The poll tax, although historically a legitimate and useful tax for some
purposes, is primarily a political problem in Tennessee because the constitution requires a poll tax receipt as a prerequisite for voting.8,While this may
be admirable as an efficient method of collecting taxes, it necessarily results,
as its drafters intended, in considerable disenfranchisement among the lower
economic classes. In 1943 popular sentiment motivated an attempt to abolish
. 5. See TENN. CoNST. CoNy. Joua. 133 (1870). The provision prohibiting classification as reported by the Committee on Finance read exactly as the adopted version. The
vote was purely formal.
6. Compare TENN. CONsT. Art. XI, § 7 (1834), with TENN. CONST. Art. XI, § 8.
7. See, in general, THOROGOOD, A FINANCIAL-HisTORy

OF TENNESSEE SINCE 1870

(1949). Chapter 1 discusses "The Historical Background-1790-1870." And see Anderson,
The Constitutional Basis of Taxation in Tennessee, 15 TENN. L. Rav. 280 (1938).
8. TENN. CoNsT. Art. IV, § 1: . . . there shall be no qualification attached to the
right of suffrage, except that each voter shall give to the jtdges of election, where he
offers to vote satisfactory evidence that he has paid the poll taxes assessed against him..."
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this requirement. Since the tax required was that "assessed against him,"
the legislature proceeded first to repeal the levying statute, and second, to
repeal all former statutes requiring voters to pay poll taxes. 9 The latter act
was contingent upon the effectiveness of the poll tax repeal.
The Tennessee Supreme Court considered the legislative action in
Biggs v. Beeler.'0 All parties agreed that the constitutional provision requiring
a poll tax was mandatory, but not self-executing. All the judges agreed that
the court could not Tforce the legislature to breathe life into a nonexecuting
provision initially, but three of them decided that the court could prevent
repeal once enacted. This, in effect, made the statute part of the constitution. 1
The question was an open one; no cases could be found in any jurisdiction
in point. Under the circumstances both policy considerations and logic seemed
to be with the dissenters.1 2 At the last session of the legislature, application
of the constitutional provision was greatly restricted by acts exempting
women13 and blind persons,' 4 providing that war service of veterans is
accepted as a lifetime prepayment of the tax,' 5 and providing that the requirement is abolished for primary elections.' 6
THE PROPERTY TAX
"The taxing power is an essential incident of sovereignty. The only limitations upon
it must be sought in the organic law. It is not conferred by constitutions-but we look
to them only for the limitation upon it. If they do not exist in the Constitution they do
not exist at all, and the State is left to measure the exercise of this tremendous power by
its necessities alone."'7

This fundamental principle guides any court wrestling with a state
constitution tax problem. Approaching the ad valorem provisions of the constitution in this negative manner, it appears that the discretion of the legislature is explicitly restricted by the following requirements: that no property
9. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1943, cc. 37, 38.
10. 180 Tenn. 198, 173 S.W.2d 144 & 946 (1943) ; Johnson v. Graham, 183 Tenn. 367,
192 S.W.2d 832, cert. denied 329 U.S. 794 (1946) (same problem with the same result).
11. The majority undoubtably would permit the legislature to make changes within
the discretion permitted by the constitution.
12. See dissent of Mr. Justice Neil in Biggs v. Beeler, 180 Tenn. 198, 214, 173 S.W.2d
144, 150 (1943) : "The court is not the keeper of the conscience of the Legislature. We
cannot substitute our own idea of moral responsibility for that of the Legislature; nor
can the court by any process known to the law compel the Legislature to perform a
plain duty that is imposed upon it by the Constitution. We are here faced with the
incongruity, if not absolute absurdity, of being called upon to yield obedience, and compel
obedience, to a statute that has been repealed and a constitutional provision that is
admittedly not self-executing. Such a thing is unknown to the history of English and
American jurisprudence." The most that can be said for the majority view is that the
result was certainly what the drafters of the constitution intended. And for a general discussion of the case, see Williams, The Poll Tax and Constitutional Problems Involved
It Its Repeal, 11 U. oF CHI. L. Rxv. 177 (1944).
13. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1944, c. 62. The constitutional provision speaks of "male
citizens."
14.
15. Id.,
Id., c.c. 209.
111. The constitutional provision permits exemption for "infirmity."
16. Id., c. 57.
17. Friedman Bros. v. Mathes, 55 Tenn. 488, 492 (1872).
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be exempt unless specifically provided; 18 that no criteria be used except
value; 1o that no classification be allowed and no special treatment be permitted 2 0 except for stocks and bonds, 21 and that no result be achieved that
does not conform with equality and uniformity. 22 The cases so hold.
The books are crammed with reports of taxpayers seeking shelter within
the exemptions, but they generally concern applications of judicial discretion
to questions of 'fact.23 Some of the standards required by the constitution
are illustrated by cases in which an eager city has pushed out its boundaries
to encompass the surrounding countryside. For a limited period the city may
offer tax exemptions or lower tax rates to make incorporation attractive to
the prospective inhabitants. The cases consistently hold that the constitution
requires taxes to be uniform and equal throughout the jurisdiction levying
the tax.2 Thus the tax rates and methods of assessment 2 1 must be the same
throughout the expanded city so far as revenues for current expenses or
future wants are concerned, even though the new additions are willing to
forego some of the customary municipal services. 20 As for the burden of the
outstanding debt, however, the new section may,27 but need not, 28 be exempt.

The principle of uniformity and equality is not applied to require new taxpayers to bear the debts of the old who received the benefits. If the city has
used the exemption method of attraction, such as exempting a factory for a
number of years 29 or farm lands, 30 the court would rule such exemptions
invalid without discussion.
Shortly after 1870 Memphis under authority of the legislature spent a
million and a half dollars paving its main business streets and sought to assess
the adjacent property owners benefited according to their frontage feet. The
court, however, decided that the equal and uniform clause prohibited special
assessments and required the money to be raised by taxing all of the city
18. See

TENN. CODE ANN.

§ 1085 (Williams, 1934); e.g., State v. Waggoner, 162

Tenn. 172, 35 S.W.2d 389 (1931).
19. Reelfoot Lake Levee Dist. v. Dawson, 97 Tenn. 151, 36 S.W. 1041 (1896) (tax
levied per acre).
20. E.g., Jones v. Memphis, 101 Tenn. 188, 47 S.W. 138 (1898).
21. Shields v. Williams, 159 Tenn. 349, 19 S.W.2d 261 (1929).
22. Compare Carroll v. Alsup, 107 Tenn. 257, 64 S.W. 193 (1901), with Taylor v.
Louisville & N.R.R., 88 Fed. 350 (6th Cir. 1898).
23. See TENN. CoE ANN. § 1085 (Williams, 1934): Eleemosynary: see e.g., Memphis
Chamber of Commerce v. Memphis, 144 Tenn. 291, 232 S.W. 73 (1921) (taxpayer failed) ;
Nashville Labor Temple v. Nashville, 146 Tenn. 429, 243 S.W. 78 (1921) (taxpayer
succeeded). Crops and Manufactured Articles: see e.g., Nashville Tobacco Works v.
Nashville, 149 Tenn. 551, 260 S.W. 449 (1923); Neuhoff Packing Co. v. Sharpe, 146
Tenn. 293, 240 S.W. 1101 (1921). $1,000 personal property exemption: Bank v. Morristown, 93 Tenn. 208, 23 S.W. 975 (1893).

24. E.g., Jones v. Memphis, 101 Tenn. 188, 47 S.W. 138 (1898).
25. See Chattanooga v. Nashville, C. & St. L. R.R., 75 Tenn. 561 (1881) (railroad
station assessed differently from other real estate).
26. See Jones v. Memphis, 101 Tenn. 188, 47 S.W. 138 (1898).
27. See id. at 192, S.W. at 139.
28. Smithville v. Adams, Tenn. Ct. App., Mar. 29, 1947.

29. American Bemberg Corp. v. Elizabethton, 180 Tenn. 373, 175 S.W.2d 535 (1943).
30. Bell v. Pulaski, 182 Tenn. 136, 184 S.W.2d 384 (1945).
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property according to its value. 31 This doctrine lingered questionably 32 for
thirty years until the practicalities of the situation and the authority in other
states caused the court to declare special assessments outside the provisions
of the constitution'because of their direct benefit characteristic. 3
Since the adoption of the present constitution (if not before) the legislature has required all property to be assessed at its actual cash value. 34
However, the assessor who conscientiously followed the statutory mandate
was the exception. 35 Does the constitution require full value assessments?
The conflicting dicta on this theoretical question require some consideration.
The Tennessee Supreme Court in the leading case of Carrollv. Almp 36
said:
"The actual cash value is the only practicable basis upon which taxes can be made
the legislative
equal and uniform, and this is clearly the constitutional requirement,
7
intent, and should be the effort of the Court as well as taxpayers.111

But Mr. Justice Sneed made this often quoted statement in an earlier Tennessee case:
"In reference to the powers of general taxation in this State, the only limitation upon
the discretion [of the legislature] is in the principle of equality."'

Then also Judge Taft, while on the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, rendered
this opinion:
"There has been much discussion at the bar upon the point whether the constitution
of 1870 requires that all property shall be assessed at its full value, or whether it would
satisfy the constitution if the taxing laws required all property to be assessed for taxation at a uniform percentage,--say 75 per cent. of its real value. . . . Speaking for
Judge LURToN and myself, we should be inclined to hold that any legislative system
of tax assessment of proerty based on a uniform percentage of its value would be 'according to its value,' and would be a compliance with the constitutional mandate."
The language of the constitution permits both constructions; yet the

Taft view seems more persuasive and is consistent with Sneed's "principle
of equality." In a recent opinion the Tennessee court reaffirmed the dictum
of Carroll v. Alsup by quoting it with approval. 40 If the court were faced
with legislative action directing assessments at less than 100%o valuation,
31. Taylor McBean & Co. v.Chandler, 56 Tenn. 349, 24 Am.Rep. 308 (1872).
32. See Reelfoot Lake Levee Dist. v. Dawson, 97 Tenn. 151, 163, 36 S.W. 1041,
1044 (1896).
33. Arnold v.Knoxville, 115 Tenn. 195, 90 S.W. 469 (1905).
34. "All property of every kind shall be assessea at itsactual cash value. The term
'actual cash value,' isdefined to mean the amount of money the property would sell
for,
ifsold at a fair, voluntary sale." TENN. CoDE ANN. § 1349 (Williams, 1934).
35. See Brown v. Greer, 40 Tenn. 696, 697 (1859) (the court deplores the practice of
assessing slaves at 50% their true value), TENN. TAx REVISION CoxatISSlON REPORT 54
(1948). See also the discussion of the railroad cases, infra pp. 122-25, and note 48, infra.
36. 107 Tenn. 257, 64 S.W. 193 (1901).
37. Id. at 292, S.W.at 202.
38. Friedman Bros. v. Mathes, 55 Tenn. 488, 492 (1872) (privilege tax case).
39. Taylor v. Louisville & N.R.R., 88 Fed. 350, 364 (6th Cir. 1898).
40. See McCord v. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry., 187 Tenn. 277, 292, 213 S.W.2d 196,
203 (1948).
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there would be considerable hesitation before following this dictum, and
perhaps the decision would go the other way.
The position taken on this question was affected undoubtedly by the
decision rendered on the principal problem under consideration in these cases.
In Carrollv. Alsup the complaining taxpayer admitted that his property was
assessed at only 90%o of actual cash value required by statute, but insisted
that he was entitled to a reduction to the alleged average 60% assessment.
Denying relief, the court pointed out that his only and proper relief was to
4
attempt to get all raised to 100% valuation. '
Previously, in Taylor v. Louisville & N.R.R.,4 2 the railroad complained
that its property was assessed at 100o of its valuation by state assessors
while local assessors in the various counties and cities through which its
road ran intentionally and systematically assessed other property at a lower
percentage of valuation. It offered 155 affidavits of tax officials, county
trustees and land owners from the various counties to support its contention.
The federal court found as a fact that in general other property was assessed
at not greater than 75% of valuation. Assuming federal equity jurisdiction,
it enjoined the collection of more than 75% of the assessment. Judge Taft said:
"This is a flagrant violation of the clause of the constitution forbidding discrimil-

nation in taxation between different species of property. That clause is self-executing.
[Citation] How is it to be remedied? It is said on behalf of the defendants that the only
method consistent with the constitution is by raising the assessments of the real and
personal property. This is no remedy at all. . . . The absolute futility of such a
course, the enormous expense and the length of time necessary in attempting to follow
it, need no comment. . . . The court is placed in a dilemma, from which it can only
escape by taking that path which, while it involves a nominal departure from the
letter of the law, does injury to no one, and secures that uniformity of tax burden wlhich
was the sole end of the constitution. To hold otherwise is to make the restrictions of
the constitution instruments for defeating the very purpose they were intended to
subserve."'

The logic and the policy reasons seem correct beyond dispute. The
decision rested entirely upon the state constitution, but the subsequent authoritative interpretation of that document by the state supreme court removed
that foundation. The Taft decision and reasoning, however, were adopted
by the United States Supreme Court and ultimately embodied in the Sioux
41. "When he comes into Court asking relief of his own assessment he must be able
to allege and show that his property is assessed at more than its actual cash value. He
may come before an Equalizing Board, or, perhaps, before the Courts, and show that
his neighbor's property is assessed at less than its actual cash value and ask to have it
raised to his own, if his is at the cash value, and in this way the Courts, Legislatures
and taxpayers will co-operate to tax all property at its actual cash value and to make
all taxes equal and uniform, as the Constitution contemplates." Carroll v. Alsup, 107
Tenn. 257, 292, 64 S.W. 193, 202 (1901). The policy was to use every available tool to
curtail the then current competitive underassessment by local officials in order to lessen
the state tax burden at the expense of others. That reason disappears with the elimination
of the state ad valorem tax. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1949, c. 90.

42. 88 Fed. 350 (6th Cir. 1898).
43. Id. at 364.
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City Bridge 44 doctrine which rests upon the equal protection clause of the
Constitution. Today federal courts will grant relief if the taxpayer can show
that he is being discriminated against within the meaning of the doctrine
and prove that proper relief is not reasonably certain within the state pro45
cedure.
The doctrine of Carrollv. Alsup still continues today 46 despite its obvious
conflict with the controlling Sioux City Bridge case, not even cited by a
Tennessee court. The aggrieved taxpayer has no statutory right to appeal to
the State Board of Equalization to reduce his assessment to the level of others
below 100% valuations; neither does the Board have statutory authority to
do so. 47 The explanation of this phenomenon seems to be twofold.
First, in the case of taxpayers assessed by local officials, the county
boards of equalization and the State Board comply in practice with the
standard of relief demanded by the equal protection clause. If the usage in a
48
particular county or city is to assess property at 75% of its valuation,
assessments are adjusted upwards or downwards to achieve the layman's
concept of fairness of maintaining everyone's assessment at about the same
percentage. In fact, any controversy would be over the valuation; the ratio
would be mechanical. The few-who do not achieve adequate relief before the
administrative boards have, at least up to the present, been entrapped in the
nonreview area of administrative discretion. Writ of certiorari alone lies from
the final determination of the State Board, and the courts will not disturb
that administrative tribunal's action unless it appears arbitrary or fraudulent
provided the Board acts within its jurisdiction and observes the statutory
requirements.49 Since valuation of property is largely a matter of opinion,
and a court's opinion will likely be no better than an administrator's, the
permissive area of discretion is considerable. In addition, the court has ex44. Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, 260 U.S. 441, 43 Sup. Ct. 190, 67 L.Ed.

340, 28 A.L.R. 979 (1923) (opinion by Taft, C. J.).

45. Hillsborough Township v. Cromwell, 326 U.S. 620, 66 Sup. Ct. 445, 90 L.Ed. 358
(1946).
46. See McCord v. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry., 187 Tenn. 277, 292, 213 S.W2d 196,

203 (1948).

47. The State Board of Equalization reviews action taken by county boards of
equalization. TENN. CoDE AxN. § 1433 (Williams, 1934). "Any taxpayer ... shall have
the right to a hearing and determination of any complaint he may make on the ground
that other property than his own has been assessed at less than the actual cash value
thereof, or at a less percentage of value than his own property or other property or that
his own property has been assessed at more than its actual cash value. . . ." Id. § 1450.
"Said board .. . shall equalize, compute, and fix the value of all such properties within
its jurisdiction by the standard of the actual cash value oi same, and, .for said purposes,
said board shall have the power, and it is made its duty to reduce or increase, values of
properties so that the values of all assessments when so equalized shall conform to said
standard of actual cash value... ." Id. § 1451.
48. "It is the practice of assessors to assess property at a certain percentage of its
value; however, there is a lack of uniformity in this respect and assessments range from
40% to 100% of value." CCH TENN. CT. par. 20-322.01.
49. TEx. ConE ANNx. §§ 1456, 1535 (Williams, 1934) ; see, e.g., W. J. Savage Co.
v. Knoxville, 167 Tenn. 642, 72 S.W.2d 1057 (1933).
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panded the ordinary discretionary limits when it wished to achieve a given
goal.50 The possibility remains that the court will be forced to meet the
problem directly; continued adherence to its present position in that event
will hazard reversal by the United States Supreme Court. Until then, Hillsborough Township v. Cromwell rx furnishes an alternative beacon to the
taxpayer.
Second, the railroads (and public utilities generally) present a separate
problem. The Taylor 5 2 decision did not deter the political-minded members
of the Railroad and Public Utilities Commission and the State Board of
Equalization 53 from continuing to assess "distributable" railroad property
at a percentage valuation above that used by local assessors in the various
counties. Tennessee has its own peculiar variation of the familiar mileage
formula whereby all railroad property is divided into two general classes,
"distributable" and "localized." To the first class, which includes roadbeds,
rolling stock and property having no actual situs, the standard mileage
formula is applied. The second class, which covers property having an actual
situs as a station or warehouse (but not roadbeds), is valued separately from
the first.5 4 Local assessors are consulted with the result that each piece of
property is assessed according to the formula applied to other property in
the county or city in which it is located.", In the cases which follow the
railroad is complaining only about its "distributable" property assessment.
In Nashladle, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Browning 56 the railroads petitioned the
state supreme court for a writ of certiorari to review the assessment by the
commission approved by the Board, on the ground, among others, that their
property (and public utility property in general) was being assessed at full
valuation while local assessors intentionally and systematically assessed other
property at lesser percentage valuations. Supporting affidavits from local
officials were presented before the Board and in the record. Since the Board
also reviewed local assessments and was under the statutory duty to see that
they were at full value,57 the reasonable inference was that the Board itself
was unlawfully discriminating between these two classes of property. The
court denied the writ stating that the petitioners did not show sufficient proof
50. See Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Browning, 176 Tenn. 245, 140 S.W.2d 781,

aff'd, 310 U.S. 362, 60 Sup. Ct. 968, 84 L.Ed. 1254 (1940).
51. 326 U.S. 620, 66 Sup. Ct. 445, 90 L. Ed. 358 (1946).

52. Taylor v. Louisville & N.R.R., 88 Fed. 350 (6th Cir. 1898).
53. The assessment of railroad and public utility companies is made by the Conmission. TENN. CODE ANN. § 150& (Williams 1934). But before the assessment becomes final
it must be approved by the Board, which can also make an independent assessment. Id. 1534.
54. Id. § 1528 (distributable), § 1529 (localized).
55. See McCord v. Nashville, C. & L. Ry., 187 Tenn. 277, 293, 213 S.W.2d 196, 204

(1948).

56. 176 Tenn. 245, 140 S.W.2d 781, aff'd, 310 U.S. 362, 60 Sup. Ct. 968, 84 L. Ed. 1254

(1940).

57. See note 47, supra.
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of the connection between the action of the local assessors and the Board to
rebut the presumption that the Board was performing its duty.
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court Mr. Justice Frankfurter
in the affirming opinion said:
"And if the state supreme court chooses to cover up under a formal veneer of
uniformity the established system of differentiation between two classes of property, an
exposure of the-fiction is not enough to establish its unconstitutionality. Fictions have
played an important and sometimes fruitful part in the development of law; and the
Equal Protection Clause is not a command of candor. So we are of opinion that such
a' discrimination, not invidious but long-sanctioned and indeed conventional, would not
be offensive to the Fourteenth Amendment simply because Tennessee had reached it
by a circuitous road. It is not the Fourteenth Amendments function to uproot systems
of taxation inseparable from the state's tradition of fiscal administration and ingrained
in the habits of its people."'

With its flank thus protected from the Sioux City Bridge59 doctrine,
the Tennessee Supreme Court seemed rather exasperated with the railroads'
subsequent attempt to have them re-examine and discard the "veneer." 60
Again it rejected the petition for relief in a confusing opinion which scrambled
together the doctrines of Carrollv. Alsup, res adjudicata and scope of review
of administrative action. It even cited the Taylor case as supporting this
position. Thus the court has permitted a limited classification of railroad
and public utility property to be read into the uniformity clause of the constitution. Whether classification of other groups could be made on the same
basis remains to be seen.
PRIVILEGE TAXES

The potentially lucrative and yet untapped reservoir of revenue which
the merchants and peddlers presented in 1834 was probably foremost in the
thoughts 'of the drafters of the constitution; "privilege" was a mere afterthought catch-all. Yet the courts were acute enough to recognize from the
first that it was the key word. The first legislature after the adoption of the
1834 constitution levied a flat tax ($50) upon merchants. An unsuccessful
objection by a wholesale grocer produced the earliest reported privilege tax
case, in which it was said:
"The first Legislature after the formation of the Constitution acted upon the idea
that any occupation which was not open to every citizen, but could only be exercised
by a license from constituted authority, was a privilege. And it is presumed this is
a correct definition in this application of the term."
58. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Browning, 310 U.S. 362, 369, 60 Sup. Ct. 968, 84
L. Ed. 1254 (1940).
59. Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, 260 U.S. 441, 43 Sup. Ct. 190, 67 1. Ed.
340 (1923) (discrimination within a class against an individual).
60. McCord v. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry., 187 Tenn. 277, 213 S.W.2d 196 (1948).

61. French v. Baker, 36 Tenn. 193, 195 (1856).
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This view reigned under that constitution and was inherited by the 1870
constitution,6 2 but it crumbled in the face of the development of modern
economic conditions.
"A privilege is whatever the Legislature choose to declare to be privilege,
and to tax as such." 63 This is the definition which the court approved in a
recent case upholding the retail sales tax as a valid privilege (or excise 04) tax.
Ingenuity could hardly devise a broader definition; it literally includes
everything. As a "phrase of art," the product of judicial history since 1856,
it has little meaning independent of the cases. The Attorney-Generals have
been its consistent advocates from 1875 05 because they first realized the need
for a sweeping flexible concept into which diverse taxes created by the legislatures could be inserted. The courts reluctantly embraced the definition as
it became clear that "privilege" was the constitutional expansion valve; the
taxes which, one by one, they upheld had become so heterogeneous that no
other definition was possible. While the first judicial recognition came as
early as 1887,66 it was only one of a series of progressively less restrictive
definitions which the court would trundle out to meet the current problem,
Not until the 1920's did this definition gain ascendency, and even today it
cannot be taken literally.
Jenkins v. Ewin,6 7 which upheld "a license tax equal in amount to the
ad valorem tax" computed upon the merchant's average stock in trade, was
the first of a uniform line of cases to point out that the "equal and uniform"
provision stopped short before the sentence which authorizes the privilege
taxes. 68 That sentence was intended as an exception to the general mandate.
The absence of this limitation upon the legislature's discretion was justified
on the ground that the merchant, a mere collection agent for the state, could
pass the tax burden to his customers. Later cases, especially those dealing
with privilege taxes whose shifting incidence was nonexistent or less certain,
09
used a smooth blend of the benefit and ability theories as the rationale,
62. See State v. Schlier, 50 Tenn. 281, 283 (1871) ; Jenkins v. Ewin, 55 Tenn. 456,
475 (1872).

63. Hooten v. Carson, 186 Tenn. 282, 286, 209 S.W.2d 273, 274 (1948), quoting Kurth

v. State, 86 Tenn. 134, 136, 5 S.W. 593, 594 (1887).
64. "Whether the tax be characterized in the statute as a privilege tax or an excise
tax is but a choice of synonymous words, for an excise tax is an indirect or privilege
tax". Bank of Commerce v. Senter, 149 Tenn. 569, 583, 260 S.W. 144, 148 (1924) (annual
corp. excise tax).
65. See Lawyers' Tax Cases, 55 Tenn. 565, 618 (1875); Phillips v. Lewis, 3 Tenn.
Cas. 230, 244 (1877).

66. See Kurth v. State, 86 Tenn. 134, 136, 5 S.W. 593, 594 (1887).
67. 55 Tenn. 456 (1872).
68. "Section 28 of article 2 of the constitution definitely indicates two objects and
two modes of taxation. The object of the first class is property taxed equally and uniformly upon its value, and the object of the second is privileges classified and taxed according to the sound discretion of the legislature". Bank of Commerce v. Senter, 149 Tenn.
569, 577, 260 S.W. 144, 146 (1924).
69. For example: "Taxation of the privilege is upon the occupation or activity carried
on amid the social, economic, and industrial environment, under protection of the state.
[Citation] Without the opportunity and protection afforded by the State, none of those
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The obscure constitutional provision which follows the privilege phrase
was explained in FriedianBros. v. Mathes.70 The tax was the same as in
Jenkins v. Ewin, but the taxpayer sold a stipulated percentage of his goods
to nonresidents. Judge Sneed pointed out that this sentence, inspired by the
Memphis merchant lobby, was intended as a damper upon the legislature's
power to tax merchants 71 in order that- they might compete more favorably
in the neighboring states. That part of the tax which was computed upon
the portion of goods sold to out-of-state buyers was held invalid.
Nine years later the Memphis merchants discovered that the discrimina2
tion in favor of interstate sellers had vanished as a result of Kelly v. Dwyer.7
In addition to the regular ad valorem tax and a license tax like that involved
in Jenkins v. Ewin, the complaining taxpayer was held liable to pay a tax
for the privilege of selling liquor. Although he sold half of his wares to
nonresidents, the court decided that it was proper to measure this tax by his
total average stock in trade. Friedman Bros. v. Mathes was distinguished as
applying only to what the court designated a "merchant's tax." The rule of
that case did not apply to a "privilege tax" because the tax was upon the,
privilege and not upon the merchant's capital, although it might be measured
by it. The legislature took the hint,73 and the constitutional provision was
rendered impotent.
The commercial interests have achieved little success in their search
for constitutional levees to contain the spreading privilege taxes. Section 30 74
proved ineffective for it was construed from the first to apply strictly to
ad valorem taxation. Thus a merchant in computing his license tax could not
eliminate stock on his shelves manufactured from the produce of the state,75
and a woman selling wine fermented from grapes raised in her own vineyard
could not escape a privilege tax upon the selling of spiritous liquors. 76 The
"direct product of the soil" provision of section 28 met the same fate. Taxclassed and taxed as privileges could exist; every element that enters into the composition
of a civilized state supplies them sustenance and strength; and it is often true that the
visible property attendant upon the exercise of the privilege is inconsequential as compared to the earnings or profits flowing from the licensed activity or occupation." Ibid.
(corp. excise tax).
70. 55 Tenn. 488 (1872).
71. "The history of this proviso is well known. There was in the Convention of
1870, a very energetic opposition to engrafting upon the New Constitution, the clause of
the Old Constitution which seemed to operate so harshly and invidiously against the
commercial community. We refer to that clause which excludes merchants, peddlers,
and privileges, from the protection of the principle of equality. When, however, it was
finally adopted, a solemn protest was presented against it by the representatives of large
commercial constituencies. And shortly thereafter, the clause now in question was brought
forward and adopted. And this was intended as a limitation upon the general power
conferred by the Constitution of 1834, and was regarded as a great triumph in behalf of
the merchant: Journ. Con., 1870, 301, 369." Id. at 496.
72. 75 Tenn. 180 (1881).
73. See TENr. CoDE ANN. §§ 1690, 1691 (Williams 1934).
74. TEN'. CoNsT. Art. II, § 30: "No article manufactured of the produce of this
State shall be taxed otherwise than to pay inspection fees."
75. State v. Crawford, McNeill & Co., 39 Tenn. 461 (1859).
76. Kurth v. State, 86 Tenn. 134, 5 S.W. 593 (1887).
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payers selling mineral waters taken from their own springs were liable for
a privilege tax on that occupation; 77 similarly, a privilege tax upon persons
operating a nursery or green house was required of a woman who grew plants
for sale in her backyard.78 Corporations with pre-1870 charter exemption
clauses also found privilege taxes inescapable, for, no matter how broadly the
clause was phrased, the courts would construe it as applicable only to ad
valorem taxation.79
In Phillips v. Lewis 80 the court considered "an act to increase the
revenue of the state, and to encourage wool growing" which imposed a
privilege tax upon the "keeping of dogs" of one dollar per dog and two dollars
per unspayed bitch. The statute was treated as a revenue measure, and not
as'an exercise of the police power. 8' The issue was thus phrased:
"... the real point presented is whether the simple ownership of property of any
kind can be declared by the legislature a privilege, and taxed as such, for if it can be
done in the case of a dog it may be done in the case of a horse, or any other species of

property."'

The reply was no, per Freeman, J.:
"But the essential element distinguishing the two modes of taxation waq intended
to be kept up. That is the difference between property and occupation or business
dealing with and reaping profit from the general public, or peculiar and public uses of
property by which a profit is derived from the community. If this distinction does not
exist, then,.as we have said, the constitution has fixed the rule of taxation with precision
in the first clause imperatively, and that it shall be ad valorem, and in the subsequent
and-sec6ndary clause and class of objects of taxation, have left the legislature free to
utterly avoid [sic] the first-by taxing the ownership of all property as a privilege."
"We need but add that to assume as correct his [the Attorney-General's] main
proposition, that whatever the legislature shall so declare is a privilege, is to make this
clause of the constitution as conferring a power, or limiting or defining a power in
the legislature, useless, inoperative, and absurd."'

While the distinction between property taxation and privilege taxation
has become much more difficult to draw since 1877, it can hardly be asserted
that no distinction remains. For example, the income tax might be fitted into
either category,85 yet it requires a flow of economic benefit which is not
essential to the ad valorem property tax. The doctrine that the mere ownership of. property cannot be a proper basis of privilege taxation seems to have
77. Seven Springs Water Co. v. Kennedy, 156 Tenn. 1, 299 S.W. 792 (1927).
'78. Humphries v. Carter, 172 Tenn. 392, 112 S.W.2d 833 (1938).
79. E.g., The Turnpike Cases, 92 Tenn. 369, 22 S.W. 75 (1893).
80. 3 Tenn. Cas. 230 (1877).
81. Similar subsequent statutes with slight modification of language were held valid
under the police power. See Ponder v. State, 141 Tenn. 481, 212 S.W. 417 (1919)
($1.50 registration fee for all dogs in counties of certain population) ; State v. Erwim, 139
Tenn. 341, 200 S.W. 973 (1918)

($3 registration fee for female dogs).

82. Phillips v. Lewis, 3 Tenn. Cas. 230, 238 (1877).
83. Id. at 240.
84. Id. at 244.
85. That question is open in Tennessee.
682, 52 S.W.2d 159, 162 (1932).

See Evans v. McCabe, 164 Tenn. 672,
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stood the test of time well. Perhaps the use tax comes closest to its underpinnings but fails to undermine its structure.
In Foster,& Creighton Co. v. Graham,6 a state road building contractor
purchased outside the state two tankcars. of gasoline which he shipped into
the state, stored and withdrew for his own use. The controlling provision
was an amendment to an act which taxed the business of importing and selling
gasoline, extending the coverage to consumers who imported, stored and
withdrew the gasoline for their own use. In upholding the tax upon storage
and use the court noted that this was a necessary extention of the original
act to prevent large consumers from tax evasion.
Likewise the use tax provisions of the 1947 Retail Sales Tax Act 87 are
an integral part of and necessary complement to the more lucrative sales tax
,provisions. 8s One might conclude that the ownership of property is in substance being taxed, but that ownership is intimately connected with a recent
business transaction. Also the amount of consideration changing hands in'
that transaction is used as the basis to compute the tax. 9 Suppose the legislature, employing similar language, enacted an annual "property use tax"
upon all property according to its value with the rate of tax to depend upon
a scheme of property classification. Then the court would probably look to
the substance and apply the doctrine of Phillips v. Lewis.
In Tentham v. Moore,90 the taxpayer was held not liable for a license
tax required of persons "shaving notes" "whether they make a business of
it, or not." He had discounted one note in a casual transaction which the
legislature intended to cover. The court reasoned:
"It follows that the legislature cannot tax a single act, per se, as a privilege, inasmuch as such act, in the nature of things, cannot, in and of itself, constitute a business,
avocation, or pursuit.""
This case proved merely a troublesome sport. An inheritance tax had been
previously upheld,92 and later so were privilege taxes upon realty transfers 93
86. 154 Tenn. 412, 285 S.W. 570 (1925).
87. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1947, c. 3; see Hooten v. Carson, 186 Tenn. 282, '209 S.W.2d 273

(1948).

88. "It is hereby declared to be the legislative intent that every person is exercising
a taxable privilege... who stores for use or consumption in this state any item or article
of tangible personal property . . .

."

TENN. CODE ANN. § 1328.24 (Williams Supp.

1949). "'Storage' means and includes any keeping or retention in this state of tangible
personal property for use or consumption in this state, or for any purpose other than sale
at retail in the regular course of business." Id. § 1328.23-g. "'Use' means and includes
the exercise of any right or power over tangible personal property incident to the ownership thereof .... " Id. § 1328. 23-h. See, in general, Note, The Tennessee Retailers'Sales Tax
Act, 1 VAND. L. R-v. 433 (1948) ; Greener, Legal Problems Under the Tennessee Sales
and Use Tax Act, 20 TENN. L. REv. 647 (1949).
89. TEEN. CoDE ANN. § 1328.24b (Williams Supp. 1949).
90. 111 Tenn. 346, 76 S.W. 904 (1903).
91. Id. at 353, 76 S.W. at 905.
92. State v. Alston, 94 Tenn. 674, 30 S.W. 750 (1895).
93. State ex rel. Stewart v. Louisville & N.R.R., 139 Tenn. 406, 201 S.W. 738 (1918).
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and theater ticket purchases. 4 The holding reflects not even a rule of evidence.
If the business or occupation is taxed, but one transaction need be shown to
prove prima facie liability and shift the burden to the taxpayer.05
The court in Corn v. Fort 16 considered an annual franchise tax measured
by invested capital upon corporations, business trusts and partnerships, but
not upon individual proprietorships. In holding the tax invalid as to the
partnerships, the court gave this reason:
"While the Legislature has a wide range of discretion in the matter of imposing
privilege taxes, it cannot arbitrarily exclude one set of individuals from the operation of
a privilege tax and include another set.... we can see no substantial reason for imposing this tax on a simple partnership, composed of individuals, and exempting the
single individuals, who may, perhaps, be engaged in the same kind of business.""

Thus in contrast with its ad valorem tax powers the legislature may reasonably classify objects of privilege taxation. If there is any rational basis for
the classification the courts will not interfere, but it must not be arbitrary or
capricious. 98 This was one of the few instances the legislature has been rebuked
for going too far.
Aside from usage of assessors condoned by the administrative boards
and the courts, there can be no classification of tangible property, real or
personal, under the present constitution. This was indicated in the discussion
of the property tax, but one possible device for escaping the clear mandate
merits discussion at this place. Suppose the legislature reduces the assessment
ratio from 100o valuation to some selected low valuation ratio to serve as
a base point. Then for suitable classes of objects which it chooses for higher
taxation, the legislature enacts a privilege tax upon the ownership of property, similar in nature to a use tax, with the rate of tax varying according to
the several classes. The tax, unlike a use tax, would be measured by the valuation of the property owned. Dictum in Carroll v. Alsup 9 makes the
success of the first step uncertain, and the doctrine of Phillips v. Lewis 100
probably would prevent the second step. The combination would be fatal;
inevitably, the court would invoke the equal and uniform clause. Yet, however
rediculous an annual privilege tax upon the privilege of owning property may
seem today, this could become a practicality in the future if the demand for
classification proves sufficiently strong and the constitution remains unaltered.
THE INCOmE TAX
Following the first World War intangible wealth increased in importance
in the Tennessee economy. Taxation under the general property tax proved
94. Knoxtenn, Theatres, Inc. v. Dance, 186 Tenn. 114, 208 S. W.2d 542 (1948).
95. Compare Wender v. Lobertini, 151 Tenn. 476, 267 S.W. 367 (1924), with Frierson
v. Ewing, 222 S.W.2d 678 (Tenn. App. (M.S. 1949).

96. 170 Tenn. 377, 95 S.W.2d 620 (1936).
97. Id. at 387, 95 S.W.2d at 623.
98. U.S. CONST. AME.ND. XIV; TENN. CONST. Art. I, § 8; TENN. CONST. Art. XI,
§8.
99. 107 Tenn. 257, 292, 64 S.W. 193, 202 (1901)

100. 3-Tenn. Cas. 230 (1877)

(quoted p. 121 szpra).

(discussed p. 128 supra).
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inefficient to administer, for taxpayers faced with unjustifiable rates chose
the easy exit of evasion. Since intangibles were not bearing their share of
the state financial burden, the 1920's produced great agitation for some
10
remedy. All efforts of constitutional change resulted in failure;X reform
necessarily had to come within the restricting bounds of the constitution.
The first crude attempt was unsuccessful. The legislature imposed a
registration fee of 15c per $100 on all mortgages and deeds of trust "in lieu
of all other taxes." Although as a privilege tax alone it was valid, the obvious
attempt to exempt from ad valorem taxation was held fatal to the entire tax. 02
The second attempt was as successful as it was ingenious. A new technique was advanced to come within the literal provision of the constitution,
"The Legislature shall have power to levy a tax on incomes derived from
stocks and bonds that are not taxed ad valorem." The first step was to omit
from the general assessment act all intangibles except money on hand and
on deposit. Next the legislature passed an act levying an annual 5% tax,
with stated exceptions, on incomes from "stocks" and "bonds" not taxed
ad valorem. 10 3 These two terms were so defined that the tax would cover
receipt of all dividends and all interest received from obligations maturing
10 4
more than six months from date of issue.
The meaning of this constitutional provision was uncertain. Taxpayers
objecting to the new tax argued that this provision was intended to cover
only property which could not be lawfully taxed ad valorem under the constitution, such as United States obligations and charter exempt stock, and
that the omission of intangibles from the ad valorem levy violated the constitutional mandate that all property was to be taxed ad valorem.
The court in Shields v. Williams,10 5 however, rejected both arguments.
In answer to the first contention Chief Justice Green wrote:
"To construe the income tax clause according to the complainants' contention is to
convict the makers of our Constitution of inserting in that solemn document a futile
provision which they must have known was vain. We are unable to entertain such an
idea,..
101. Voters defeated proposals to call a constitutional convention in 1916 (for 64,393,
against 67,342), in 1919 (for 7,680, against 41,839), and in 1924 (for 59,198, against
83,121). Taxation revision was one principal issue. Nashville Banner, Nov. 15, 1949,
p. 1, Col. 1.
102. State ex rel. Hauk v. American Trust Co., 141 Tenn. 243, 208 S.W. 611 (1918).

103. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1929, c. 86, c. 116 (Hall Income Tax).
104. "The word 'bond' shall be held and construed to include all obligations issued by
any person, firm, joint stock company, business trust or corporation organized and doing
business under the laws of the State of Tennessee, or any other state, evidenced by an
instrument whereby the obligor is bound to pay interest to the obligee regardless of whether
the obligor is doing business in the State of Tennessee, or whether the obligation under
the terms of which the interest accrues is a mortgage or lien on property located in the
State of Tennessee or beyond the jurisdiction thereof; provided that the word 'bond' shall
not include ordinary commercial paper, trade acceptance, etc., maturing in six (6) months
or less from the date of issuance." TENN. CoDE ANx. § 1123.3 (Williams 1934).
105. 159 Tenn. 349, 19 S.W.2d 261 (1929). See Trotter, The Tennessee Income Tax
Law of 1929, 8 TsNx. L. Rsv. 106 (1930).
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"The clause, in our opinion, was not designed to authorize an attempt to tax
incomes from stocks and bonds not taxable but to authorize a tax upon incomes derived
from stocks and bonds that were (lawfully) not taxed ad valorem."'1

The next exemption was lawful because the constitution did not require
"double taxation." 107
"Such instruments merely call for money. They have no intrinsic value. The
money upon which such bonds are based is assessed.... The substance does not escape,
only the symbol is freed.
"The o-kner of a bond is entitled, besides interest, to receive the money called for
when his bond matures. Meanwhile, the money coming to him is being taxed.
"The owner of a share of stock in a corporation whose corporate property is
assessed is entitled, besides dividends, to his part of the corporate property when the
corporation is wound up. Meanwhile, the corporate property coming to him is being
taxedL'n0

The court placed great reliance upon a line of corporation cases which
held that while capital stock of corporation and the shares of stock in hands
of stockholders were separate items of property, each a proper subject for
taxation, the constitution did not require both to be taxed. 10 9 The analogy
is not compelling in persuasiveness. These were cases dealing with domestic

corporations and resident shareholders in a situation where the state was
certain to obtain revenue. Legal conceptualism is more narrow in distinguish-

ing shares of stock from the capital stock of a corporation than in distinaguishing a debtor from a creditor. Also, in these cases it is more apparent
that the tax is coming ultimately out of the same pocket than in the debtorcreditor relationship. The analogy, of course, is closer when applied to the

shareholder and corporate property.
After determining that the stock and bond clause applied to other

intangibles of a similar nature, the court pointed out that this clause, like the
privilege clause, was an exception carved from the general ad valorem mandate,

alone the equal and uniform clause applied. Thus the legislature in
the exercise of its stock and bond taxing power could employ reasonable
classification, either ,by selection of objects to be taxed or by varying the
rates upon object selected. 110 The exemption of interest-bearing obligations
to which

106. Id. at 359, 19 S.W.2d at 265.
107. This is the basic theory of "double taxation": A owns a house and lot worth
$10,000 and B owns a house and lot worth $5,000. They exchange properties, with A
taking a $5,000 note and mortage. Both houses and lots continued to be taxed ad valorem,
and to tax the note would be "double taxation." The note and mortgage represent no
new wealth, but only the right to money (or property) at a future date. State lines may
or may not be taken into consideration. The logical extention of this theory would be
to tax only tangible property. For a society like ours which is economically constructed
of debts and credits the theory seems preposterous. Nor is it reconcilable with either
the ability or benefit theories of taxation, except in the simplest examples. As used in
this paper, "double taxation" is only referring to the ad valorem tax.
108. Shields v. Williams, 159 Tenn. 349, 363, 19 S.W.2d 261, 266 (1929).
109. Id. at 362, 19 S.W.2d at 265.
110. Another method of classification has been recently introduced. Persons who receive $25 or less taxable income from stocks and bonds need file no return, but if more
than $2S is received, all is taxed. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1949, c. 221.
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maturing within six months was found reasonable. Under the court's "double
taxation" theory it is immaterial whether or not the property underlying the
stock or bond is located within the state, for presumably it is being taxed
ad valorem wherever located. Yet that fact may properly serve as a basis for
a variation in the-tax rates."'
In State exrel. Hauk v. Ainerican Trust Co., 1 1 2 in which the court held
invalid the in-lieu mortgage registration fee, the court neither realized nor
considered the possibilities of the stock and bond clause. This it admitted
in the principal case, explaining that concessions of counsel led them astray.
3
No attempt was made either to distinguish the holding or to overrule it."1
Nevertheless the "double taxation" approach does reject the Hauk holding
entirely, for the court permits the legislature to exempt all intangibles which
may be fitted into that concept. Nothing in the opinion indicates that they
have to be taxed in some other manner; in fact, stocks and bonds which pay
no income are not taxed at all.' 14
If, rather than Shields v. Williams, the facts of the Hauk case had been
presented to the court again in 1929 with the Attorney-General relying upon
the stock and bond provision, it would seem probable that the registration
fee tax would still have met its original 'fate. It is unlikely that the drafters
of the constitution intended that a mortgagee could be exempt from all but a
nominal fee where the land was in the state, or pay no tax where the mortgaged land was outside the state. Faced with the possibility of releasing
intangible wealth from taxation completely, the court would have construed
the stock and bond provision in a different manner. The opinion might have
read: "Viewing section 28 as a whole, we find that it requires all property
to be taxed ad valorem, but, by way of exception, it permits the legislature
an alternative method of taxing intangibles similar in nature to stocks and
bonds whereby only the income is taxed. That alternative has not been followed
here; the tax is invalid as an unauthorized exemption."
Why did the court fail to use similar reasoning in Shields v. Williams
and thus distinguish its actual decision in the Hauk case? There may be
several explanations. Making the alternative clause mandatory would have
required the taxation of interest-bearing obligations maturing within six
months. This result would meet general approval because the only valid
reason to exempt them is administrative convenience. The court, however,
111. Today the general flat rate is 6%, but income from stock in any corporation,
75% of whose corporate property, including the franchise, is taxable in Tennessee for ad
valorem purposes, is taxable at 4%. TENN. CoDy ANN. § 1123.1 (Williams, 1934).
112. 141 Tenn. 243, 208 S.W. 611 (1918).
113. "It was assumed in that case, following the concession of counsel, that mortgage
or the debt secured by a mortgage must be taxed and that question was 'not examined."
Shields v. Williams, 159 Tenn. 349, 366, 19 S.W.2d 261, 267 (1929).
114. See White, Hall Income Tax, in 1 PAPERs ON CONST. REvisiON 83, 86. (Univ.
of Tenn. 1947).
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may have decided that to hold that provision invalid would endanger the
entire act.
The court was 'also seeking a theoretical justification for the fact that
stocks and bonds which earned no income paid no tax. Perhaps the judges
felt that the alternative theory would require taxing them at the general
property rates, the very thing the legislature was trying to avoid. Yet if this
were true the purpose of the constitutional provision would be defeated. The
drafters of the provision, though they realized that there would be gaps in
the flow of interest or dividends, still permitted no implication that the income
method should not be followed consistently. The legislature would be expected
to take this factor into consideration in determining the methods and rates of
taxation. It is certainly more reasonable to infer an intention that stocks and
bonds taxable under the income alternative should pay no tax when they
earned no income than to infer an intention that stocks and bonds would
have to pay no taxes at all if the legislature saw fit.
There is no more reason to apply the equal and uniform clause under
the alternative theory than under the court's "double taxation" theory. The
legislature should be able to employ reasonable classification in determining
rates, and in determining which object should be subject to which alternative,
but not to exempt property entirely.
There was a tremendous pressure upon the court to find some answer
to a very practical problem within the restricting limits of the constitution.
The statute before them was the only feasible solution in sight, and state
revenues were expected to be increased rather than diminished. There was
no danger that the legislature would exempt stocks and bonds from taxation.
On the contrary, every effort was bent toward requiring this politically popular
source of revenue to pay more in the future than it had done in the past. The
"double taxation" theory, which must have been pressed forward at the bar,
met the immediate need and was adopted as a convenient tool in upholding
the act. One cannot quarrel seriously with the result, but one can question the
reasoning employed.
The question remains whether or not the non-income producing stocks
and bonds, as defined in the income tax statute, may be taxed at a very low
rate under the constitution. If they were to be taxed under the ad valorem
clause, the higher general property rates would apply. Following the court's
reasoning in Shields v. Williams, however, the legislature has properly released them from that tax. Suppose then the legislature declares in substance
the ownership of non-income producing stocks and bonds to be a taxable
privilege, with the tax (say five mills) to be measured by the value of the
stocks and bonds. The merchants' privilege tax offers a precedent for measuring the amount of the tax by the value of property owned. The broad definition
of privilege would be satisfied; the reasonable classification requirement
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should be easily met as income producing stocks and bonds are already taxed.
The real obstacle is the doctrine of Phillips v. Lewis"15 that the ownership
of property per se cannot be a proper subject for privilege taxation. The
reason underlying the doctrine, to prevent rendering the ad valorem mandate
a nullity, does not apply in this situation. That mandate no longer applies to
this type of property. In addition, it has been noted that the use taxes, necessary complements to the sales taxes, have nibbled away at this doctrine. Here
it might be contended that this privilege tax is a natural complement to,
although not absolutely essential to, the income tax. The court might well
reject these arguments on the grounds that property is the real object of
taxation, and therefore the tax must meet the requirement of the ad valorem's
equal and uniform clause. Yet these contentions are plausible, and have a
reasonable chance of acceptance, especially if it becomes apparent that all
efforts to alter the constitution in the near future will prove fruitless.
Money either on hand or on deposit remains nominally subject to the
ad valorem tax,"16 neither one being considered suitable for the income tax.
The former, earning no income, could hardly be included within any definition
of a bond. Whether viewed as intangible or tangible," 7r money on hand would
not qualify as a suitable object within the "double taxation" theory for it
represents nothing else tangible which is being taxed. It seems doomed to
remain under the burden of the general property rates. In practice that burden
would be slight since money on hand is rarely assessed.
Money on deposit, certainly an intangible, may or may not be earning
interest. Deposits which pay interest could come within a definition of a
bond, but since they may be withdrawn on demand or on short notice they
would fall within the present six months clause. There is nothing in Shields v,
Williams, however, to prevent the legislature from taxing interest-bearing
obligations maturing within six months. Deposits earning no interest, on the
other hand, probably could not be squeezed into a definition of a bond with
any success. This would not seem essential to obtain relief from ad valorem
taxation.
Both types of deposits might satisfy the "double taxation" theory, which
logically would cover all intangibles (but not money). These deposit may
be traced through the bank into cash on hand, private loans, state and local
government obligations, United States obligations, deposits with other banks
and sundry minor accounts. Correspondent bank deposits present the same
115. 3 Tenn. Cas. 230 (1877). See discussion p. 128 supra.
116. TaxN. CODE ANN. § 1355 (Williams, 1934).

117. A coin whose metallic content is actually worth its face value would be tangible
property, but probably this is not true of coins presently in circulation. On the other hand,
our money supply (dollar amount) consists mainly of Federal Reserve Notes, which are
mere promises to pay by the Federal Reserve Banks, backed by gold and federal government obligations. Other types of money fall somewhere in between. Money is generally
treated with intangibles for tax purposes, but even if considered an intangible it is distinguishable by its unique negotiability.
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problem, one step further into the maze of the banking system, and can
furnish no answer. The cash in the till is taxed, as all banking institutions
pay ad valorem taxes.118 If the depositor had invested directly in private
loans or public obligations," 9 it is clear that the theory would apply. If the
bank is considered a mere conduit, the same result should be reached. It is
apparent that tangible taxable property ultimately underlies bank deposits
in the same manner as for bonds. The analogy to the already exempt demand
notes. is inescapable, even if only the relationship between the depositor and
the bank is considered. Thus there seems to be no theoretical obstacle to
exempting all bank deposits from ad valorem taxation. Nevertheless, the
court may elect to stop short with the bank and not venture into this labyrinth
df credits under the banner of "double taxation."
In 1931 the legislature, confronted with declining state revenue, enacted
a personal progressive income tax, which the court held unconstitutional in
Evans v. McCabe. 20 In arguing the case the Commissioner conceded that if
the income tax were a property tax it would be invalid as its rates did not
correspond with the general property rate, but contended that the income tax
was a privilege tax and valid tinder the privilege clause. The court in Shields
v. Williams 12 had specifically declined to determine the nature of the income
tax, and again it refused to meet the problem. The answer was considered
immaterial because under either view the tax was prohibited by the constitution. Mr. Chief Justice Green gave the reason as follows:
"It therefore seems to us, treating the assailed tax as a property tax, upon principles too well established by authority to be challenged, that vhen the constitution by
way of exception to a general provision against inequality in taxation conferred upon the
legislature the power to tax only one class of incomes, that instrument necessarily denied
to the legislature the power to tax incomes of other classes. Likewise, treating the
income tax as a privilege tax, when the constitution, after it had sanctioned the power
of the legislature to tax other privileges without restriction, designated one class of
incomes to be taxed, that instrument necessarily denied to the legislature the power to
tax incomes of other classes."'

Further in the opinion, he adds: "The income tax clause of our constitution
is either a special power conferred, or a special restriction imposed. .
2 3
either view it destroys" the Act.'

.

.In

Thus the ourt construes the stock and bond (or income tax) clause as
being an exception to both the general property mandate and to the privilege
clause, itself an exception to the general property mandate. To impute this
118. TENN. CODE ANN. § 1392 (Williams, 1934).
119. Of course, the property underlying public obligations presumably is not taxed
ad valorem, but the policy which exempts the property would, under the theory, exempt
it from "double taxation." The same would be true of other exemptions.
120. 164 Tenn. 672, 52 S.W.2d 159 (1932).
121. 159 Tenn. 349, 366, 19 S.W.2d 261, 267 (1929).

122. Evans v. McCabe, 164 Tenn. 672, 680, 52 S.W.2d 159, 161 (1932).
123. Id. at 682, 52 S.W.2d at 162.
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dual capacity seems unjustifiable unless it is required by the context or the
subject matter. In the usual course of drafting a constitution or a statute, the
author would begin with a general provision which he would modify with
appropriate exceptions. Some of the exceptions might require special qualifications. A second exception would not .ordinarily be intended to be also a
special qualification of the first exception, nor would a special qualification
to an exception ordinarily be intended to be an independent exception to the
general provision.
The position of the stock and bond clause is such that it could either be
a modification of the privilege exception or a second exception to the general
mandate. If it had been inserted before the privilege clause, the inference that
it modified the general provision alone would be more compelling. Its location,
however, does not demand that it be both. Nor does the subject matter, the
taxation of stocks and bonds, require the clause to modify both preceding
clauses, but rather tends to connect with the general mandate alone. In short,
neither the context nor the subject matter demand a departure from the
general rule of interpretation.
The question remains, which of the alternatives did the drafters have
in mind. The location of the clause sheds little light on this problem. The
subjett matter is the taxation of property, not the taxation of privileges, and
this would seem to create a reasonable, if not compelling, inference to the
general property clause. It has previously been submitted that the provision
under consideration was intended to give the legislature an alternative method
24
of taxing stocks and bonds. In addition, the court in Shields v. Williams'1
previously said that the provision was an exception to the ad valorem clause.
If a personal progressive income tax is to be accepted, not only must
the court be persuaded that the stock-and-bond clause limits solely the property clause but it also must be convinced that the income tax is a privilege tax.
This may be difficult because the constitution speaks of income only in connection with property. It would seem that a peisuasive argument could be
made that the drafters, thinking of the problems associated with stocks and
bonds, created a special type of income tax, perhaps here a property income
tax, but they did not have in mind a personal income tax which they left to
the discretion of the legislature under the unqualified privilege clause. There
is nothing inconsistent with having both an in-lieu property income tax and
a personal income tax under the privilege power. It is beyond the scope of
this paper to enter into a detailed analysis of the nature df the tax itself to
124. 159 Tenn. 349, 366, 19 S.W.2d 261, 267 (1929). This statement, however, was'
made in determining that the equal and uniform clause was not applicable, and it did not
embarrass the court when later the clause was found also to be a qualification of the
privilege clause.
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determine whether or not it is a privilege tax.12 However, it would seem
that a modern court attacking the problem afresh would tend to find it a
privilege tax.
A state constitution does not confer the power of taxation upon the
legislature; rather it limits the power which the legislature would ordinarily
have. 120 It is a general rule of construction that limitations on the taxing
power must be distinctly and positively expressed, for they will not be inferred by implication. 1 27 This doctrine lends support to the analytical approach
outlined above; a court should be reluctant to deny the government this
major method of securing needed revenue.
The court in Evans v. McCabe, however, seized upon the word "income"
and, since the nature of an income tax was uncertain, used it as a link to
both the property and privilege clauses. The subject of the provision was
found to be the legislature's power of income taxation, and the specific
permission to use this power in one limited situation was deemed sufficient
to imply a prohibition against its use in any different manner. This analysis,
though not unreasonable, is unfortunate.
A personal progressive income tax is not possible under the present
constitution unless this case is overruled. The approach indicated above seems
the best line ojf attack, yet it is far from certain that the court would reverse
itself. Generally a practical outside pressure to obtain a given goal must be
present for new theory to displace old.
AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION

The voters of Tennessee have rejected numerous attempts to change the
constitution, which remains unaltered since its adoption in 1870. The explanation for the absence of any constitutional changes lies partly in the amending
process itself.12S But all attempted methods have failed-individual amend129
ments, constitutional conventions and limited constitutional conventions.
125. See Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, on rehearing, 158 U.S.
601 (1895); Brown, The Nature of the Incoine Tax, 17 AftiN-. L. R-v. 127 (1933);
MAGILL, TAXABLE INCOME, c. 6 (Rev. ed. 1945).

126. See Friedman Bros. v. Mathes, 55 Tenn. 488, 492 (1872) (quoted p. 119 supra).

127. See Vertrees v. State Board of Elections, 141 Tenn. 645, 658, 214 S.W. 737,
740 (1919) (mandatory requirement that all males pay a poll tax did not prohibit poll tax
on women).
128. TENN. CoxsT. Art. XI, § 3: "Any amendment or amendments to this Constitution may be proposed in the Senate or House of Representatives; and, if the same shall
be agreed to by a majority of all the members elected to each of the two Houses, such
proposed amendment or amendments shall be entered on their Journals, with the yeas and
nays thereon, and referred to the General Assembly then next to be chosen; and shall be
published six months previous to the time of making such choice; and if, in the General
Assembly then next chosen as aforesaid, such proposed amendment or amendments shall
be agreed to by two-thirds of all members elected to each House, then it shall be the
duty of the General Assembly to submit such proposed amendment or amendments to the
people, in such manner, and at such time as the General Assembly shall prescribe. And
if the people shall approve and ratify such amendment or amendments, by a majority of
all the citizens of the State, voting for Representatives, voting in their favor, such amendment or amendments shall become part of the Constitution. When any amendment or
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Awaiting the General Assembly in 1951 are two proposed amendments
30
would liberalize
passed by the last legislature. One proposed amendment
the amending process to allow the submission to the people of either a proposed amendment or a proposal to call a convention by a two-thirds vote of
both houses of a single legislature. A majority of votes cast for either proposal
will be sufficient for its adoption. The suggested amendment also eliminates
the six-year rule, provides for limited conventions, and specifically requires
ratification vote by the people of any action taken by a convention. This amendment, being less controversial than a substantive change, should have a good
chance of being accepted, but apathy is the ever present opponent. Perhaps
in this manner a way may.be paved for tax alterations if the current proposed
amendment on the taxing power is defeated.
The second proposed amendment awaiting the new legislature is as
follows (segmented for the reader's convenience) :
"Art. II, sec. 28: All property, real, personal or mixed, shall be taxed, but the
Legislature may except such as may be held by the State, by Counties, Cities or Towns,
and used exclusively for public or corporation purposes, and such as may be held and
used for purposes purely religious, charitable, scientific, literary or educational, and shall

except One Thousand ($1,000.00) Dollars' worth of personal property in the hands of
each taxpayer, and the direct product of the soil in the hands of the producer.

"All property subject to an ad valorem tax shall be valued in such.nianner and to
such extent as the Legislature shall direct, and the Legislature shall have power to
classify property for taxation, and to fix a different rate or a different value for different
classes. No one species of property from which a tax may be collected shall be taxed
higher than any other species of property of the same class, except as hereinafter provided with respect to monies on hand or on deposit and other intangible property.
"But the Legislature shall have power to tax merchants, peddlers and privileges in
such manner as they may from time to time direct. The portion of a merchant's capital
used in the purchase of merchandise sold by him to non-residents and sent beyond the
State shall not be taxed at a rate higher than the ad valorem tax on property.
"The income from stocks, bonds, money on hand or on deposit, choses in action
or other intangible property not subjected to an ad valorem tax, shall be taxed in such
manner as may be designated by law; provided, however, that said property so enumerated not producing an income as defined by law shall be taxed ad valorem at a rate not
amendments to the Constitution shall be .proposed, in pursuance of the foregoing provisions,
the same shall, at each of the said sessions, be read three times on three several days
in each House. The Legislature shall not propose amendments to the Constitution oftener
than once in six years. The Legislature shall have the right, at any time, by law, to
submit to the people the question of calling a Convention to alter, reform or abolish this
Constitution, and when, upon such submission, a majority of all the votes cast shall be in
favor of said proposition, then delegates shall be chosen, and the Convention shall assemble
in such mode and manner as shall be prescribed." No other state has ever conceived
such a scheme, See Hudson, The Amending Process in State Constitutio s in I PAPERS
oN CoNsT. REvisiom 1 (Univ. of Tenn. 1947).
129. See in general McCLURE, STAT CONSTITUTION-MAKING, WITH ESPECIAL
REFERENCE To TmNNEsEE, 354-56 (1916); Witham, On Amending the Constitution of

Tennessee, 11 Tmwix. L. REv. 175 (1933). On the limited constitution, see Cummings v.
Beeler, 189 Tenn. 446, 223 S.W.2d 913 (1949), 3 VAND. L. REv. 111; Dodd, State Con-

stitutional Conventions and State Legislative Power, 2 VAND. L. REv. 27 (1948); Sims,

Limited ConstitutionalConvention in Tennessee, 21 TEsN. L. REv. 1 (1949) ; Williams, A
Limited Constitutional Convention, 21 TENN. L. REv. 249 (1950).
130. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1949, Sen. J. Res. No. 34 (adopted April 14, 1949).
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exceeding ten (10c) cents on the One Hundred ($160.00) Dollars. The Legislature
shall determine whether and to what extent the counties or incorporated towns shall
share in such income tax.
"All citizens of this State over the age of twenty-one years, except such persons
as may be exempted by law on account of age or other infirmity, may be liable to a
poll tax of not less thau fifty (50c) cents or more than One($1.00) Dollar per annum,
and no County or Corporation shall levy a poll tax exceeding the amount levied by the
State.""

A constitutional amendment is essential to eliminate any possibility of
the poll tax being used as a tool of disenfranchisement. The natural approach
would be through the suffrage section, but an alternative would be a prohibitory provision in the tax section. Mere abrogation of the present mandatory requirement would be inadequate, because the historic poll tax could be
drawn from the sovereign's residual taxing powers at the legislature's pleasure.
However, the proposed amendment, permitting repeal of the tax in the legislature's discretion, would satisfy the reasoning of Biggs v. Beeler18 2 and
allow frustration of the suffrage mandate. This limited change seems wise,
for to attempt a more drastic step would politically endanger the adoption of
the entire tax section. In addition, the poll tax may have a proper role in the
local field once divorced from its political stigma.
The proposed amendment retains the requirement that all property is
to be taxed except for a limited number of stated exemptions, and the provision for intangibles tolls the death of exemption arising from "double taxation." The theory seems to be this: since the benefits of state and local governments inure to all property, all should bear some of the expense of
government; taxpayers who have more property receive a greater benefit,
usually are better able to pay, and should contribute a larger amount. When
the property tax is viewed in its proper perspective, juxtaposing the income
and consumption taxes, this policy is valid. Its regressive tendency is reduced
by the permission for classification and special treatment of intangibles which
will allow the burden to be apportioned according to sound economic principles. The 1870 reaction to the existing abuses under the 1834 constitution
went to the extreme of demanding that all property, with slight regard to
differences or special problems, be treated in the same manner. That theory
was doomed to become unfair and unworkable; thus in 1950 the policy is to
return to a middle ground by allowing the legislature sufficient freedom to
analyze the special problems and to meet the diverse needs. Yet all property
must contribute something, for the experience under the 1834 constitution was
a sufficient warning not to return to"wholesale legislative exemptions.
131. Slight change in section 29 was also submitted to make that section consistent
with the proposed section 28. Tenn. Pub. Acts, 1949, Sen. J. Res. No. 33 (adopted
April 14, 1949).
132. 180 Tenn. 198, 173 S.W.2d 946 (1943) (discussed pp. §§ supra).
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The exemption clause stands unaltered except for the omission of the
direct product of the soil in the hands of the producer's immediate vendee.
Under the equal protection clause of the Constitution like products imported
into Tennessee merited the benefit of this provision, 13 3 a result which the
Commission considered an adequate justification for its deletion.1 34 Since it
is difficult to understand why even domestic products deserve this special
treatment, one cannot quarrel with this action. Why retain the exemption of
the direct product in the hands of the producer? Perhaps the drafters of the
1870 constitution thought that because the income from other tangible property was not to be taxed, the farmer's inventory should not be taxed, yet
money on hand was considered taxable. Farmers often hold their crops
awaiting a favorable market, and a tax might tend to discourage this practice.
The short answer to the reason for its existence, however, is that farmers
dominated the 1870 convention. Whatever the justification, if any, may be
under the 1870 constitution with its equal treatment, there is none whatsoever
under the proposed amendment, for any special factor concerning crops may
receive the attention of the legislature in the exercise of its classification
discretion. The retention may be explained only as a political expedient to
prevent alienation of the rural vote which has played an important role in
35
defeating any constitutional change.'
No proposal has been submitted to alter section 30, which exempts
articles manufactured from domestic produce. The policy, dating like the
provision itself from 1796, is to provide local industry with an incentive,
a mild one compared with preferential treatment given new industry in some
of the neighboring southern states. It may well be that Tennessee would gain
long-term economic benefits from an expanded section 30 which would allow
the legislature to give special treatment for a limited period to new industries.
However, the section as it now stands has no useful purpose which could not
be accomplished under the classification power, and it should be eliminated. 36
The permissive eleemosynary and governmental exemptions, retained by
the proposed amendment, have apparently proved successful. The policy
underlying the former, of course, is that those institutions do work which
benefits society generally and which otherwise might have to be done by the
state. As for the latter, it is generally considered better policy for governmental
units not to tax each other's property. "Robbing Peter to pay Paul" is here
added to the same reasons that support the charitable exemptions. However,
133.
134.
135.
change.
136.

Nashville Tobacco Works v. Nashville, 149 Tenn. 551, 260 S.W. 449 (1923).
See Tenn. Pub. Acts 1949, H. Res. No. 28, at 1098.
In the 1949 close convention-proposal vote the rural counties voted against
Nashville Banner, Nov. 14, 1949, p. 1, col. 5.
See White, Preferential Treatbnent of Articles Manufactured from Produce of
the State, in 1 PAPERS ON CoNsr. RmIS oN 87 (Univ. of Tenn. 1947).
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where the policy ends and taxation begins remains within the discretion of
the legislature, and the exemptions should not be mandatory. The legislature
should have the necessary freedom to meet special problems, such as to take
proper steps where it appears too much property is being stricken from the
tax rolls through either exemption.
What is the policy supporting the $1,000 personal property exemption?
One reason may be administrative convenience; but in order to make the
ad valorem tax less regressive, the principal policy seems to be the exception
of life's basic necessities such as minimum clothing, household goods and
perhaps tools of trade. Since each taxpayer has this exemption, 8 7 a family
would ordinarily have several, while slight juggling of ownership within a
household would produce as many exemptions as there were members. At
the 1870 price level this exemption was so generous that an average taxpaying
family, would pay no personal property tax, and even today it seems unusually
liberal. The $1,000 exemption ought to apply to a family unit, or it should
be reduced to a more reasonable figure ($250 to $500) allowing one exemption to every family member. However, an attempted reduction of exemptions
could spell political suicide.
The policy behind this exemption does not extend to automobiles and
trucks except in instances where a motor vehicle might be considered a tool
of trade. Even here it would be rare that the taxpayer did not have other
property sufficient to exhaust his exemption. It was estimated recently that
in Tennessee $400,000,000 worth of motor vehicles escape ad valorem taxation.188 Conscientious assessors could reduce this figure, but the obvious
administrative expedient is to require payment of the ad valorem tax at the
same time the owner purchases his license tags. This would be im~possible to
administer under the present provision, adopted by the Commission, yet a
slight alteration in the phrasing should prove sufficient. After "one thousand
dollars of personal property" simply insert "--but not motor vehicles." 119
Moreover, the exemption could be narrowed by replacing "personal property"
with a phrase specifically enumerating various types of personal property
considered to come within the policy of the exemption. 140
No change is made in the privilege clauses. The provision concerning a
merchant's capital when goods are sold to nonresidents should be eliminated.
137. See Bank of Morristown v. Morristown, 93 Tenn. 208, 23 S.W. 975 (1893).
138. TENN. TAX RmVISlo, CoatmfissioN REPORT 19 (1948).
139. See GA. CoNsT. Art. VII, § 1, par. 4-compare CoLo. CoNsr. Art X, § 6 with FLA.

CoNsT. Art. IX, § 13.
140. See GA. CONsT. Art. VII, § 1, par. 4 (personal clothing, household and kitchen
furniture, domestic animals, tools) ; TEX. CONST. Art. VIII, § 1 (household and kitchen
furniture) ; W. VA. CONsT. Art. X, § 1 (household goods).
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Devised in iniquity, evaded by legal finesse, it stands senile and useless. 41
Permission to levy a personal progressive income tax is conspicuous by its
absence. While it would seem good policy to permit the state this reserve
power, the insertion of such a provision would certainly insure defeat of the
amendment. Evans v. McCabe 1 42 remains the roadblock to be removed.
Under the proposed amendment the legislature is permitted discretion
in classifying property for taxation. All property within a single class must
be treated equally, and of course the classification must be reasonable, yet
these are the only limits pertaining to real and personal tangible property.
Some state constitutions prohibit the subclassification of realty, 143 but freedon. here seems necessary to permit special treatment of problems like re
forestation or soil conservation. Also, other distinctions properly might be
44
drawn such as assessing land and improvements differently.
Intangible property not producing income must be treated separately
and not taxed over one mill per dollar valuation. Since nothing prohibits subclassification or requires the maximum rate to be applied, perhaps that rate
could be set somewhat higher without causing hardship. Intangibles producing
income could still be taxed ad valorem, but if not, they must be taxed upon
their income. The stock and bond clause is expanded to cover all intangibles
(including money on hand), but- classification would be permitted as before.
Although the proposed amendment could be improved, it is adequate
to cope with most current problems. The legislature is permitted great freedom
to analyze and solve the problems arising -from the taxation 6f property with
different characteristics. A given revenue requirement may be so allocated
that all property will contribute its proper share without being unduly
burdened. Yet no constitution can insure wise legislators or faithful and
efficient administrators, both indispensable to a laudable tax system. If the
revision is successful, it may become an incentive for both to correct the
present deplorable local tax machinery.
A recent commission, after studying tax reform in Tennessee, reported
wholesale exemption of some species of property, over taxation of other
species, whole counties underassessed, unbearably high rates, and unjust
141. Discussed p. 127 supra.
142. 164 Tenn. 672, 52 S.W.2d 159 (1932) (discussed pp. 136-38 supra).
143. See MD. CoNsr., Deci. of Rts., Art. 15; Mo. CoNsT. Art. X, §§ 4, 7; WAsir.
Coxs.

Art. VII, § 1.

144. See CALIF. Consr. Art. XIII § 2; Mn. Coxsr., Decl. of Rts., Art. 15.

See

generally White, Revision of the Taxation Uniformity Clause in the State Constitution
in 1 PAPERS oN CoNsr. REViSION 79 (Univ. of Tenn. 1947).
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discrimination against many individual taxpayers. Its reaction to this condition sounds the challenge, but the goal will not be easily obtained.
"We wish to warn the state that any tax which is permitted to slip into sucti a
deplorable status of inequality over a considerable number of years is almost certain
to be destroyed by public wrath if not by its own progressive disintegration. However
this state cannot afford to have this fate overtake the property tax because this tax is not
only a good tax when properly defined and well administered, but is inevitably one of
the best major sources for financing local self-government. The property tax must
be saved, 5purified and enforced if we are to keep local government strong and independent."M4

145. TENN. TAx REvIsIon COMMISSION REPORT 54 (1948).

